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Afires t_he Acquittal, Le Deluge: Release Procedures and
H o~at1on of the Burden of Proof in Subsequent Review
earings Following a Finding of "Not Guilty by Reason
of Insanity" in State of New Jersey v. Hetra Fields *
L.

~hile t~e

PERLIN,

ESQ.**

academically interesting but empirically fruitless debate rages on

lit~cernmg ~he issue of the abolition of the insanity defense, 1 there has been

Gu·f analytical attention paid to the fate of those who are found "Not
1
th ty. by Reason of Insanity" (NGRI). Although we have begun to realize
hi a~i _m t_he_ words of two attorneys with vast experience in this
tr; Y spec1a_hze_d field, "No [other] group has been more deprived of
to atment, d1scnminated against, or mistreated, "2 the issue of what happens
psy P~_rso?s following an NGRI finding has not exactly set the legal or
Poli~· Iafnc world on fire. Although the "Son-of-Sam"-type case stokes
how ica ferment and inspires demagoguery on all sides, the hard issues of
_a an NGRI patient is to be treated - both procedurally and substantively
~~ r~1egated to the drafting room floor, so to speak. 3
com . is clear, of course, that all of the problems which relate to the
proc~tment of and treatment of civilly committed patients - by what
com~iures a person is committe?; what process is due; fo~ ?o~ long is the
com _tment; ~hat sort of hearing must be held; what c1v1! nghts does a
that ~I~ted P~~1ent possess - are applicable to NGRI patients as well, 4 and
issu
m ~dd1t10n - the very nature of the NGRI patient's status raises other
per es which beg definitive (or at least non-murky) solutions: Can such a
finJ~n ;ibe committed indefinitely to a hospital_ by reason ~f _the NGRI
wh· h g. Does the NGRI verdict imply the comm1ss1on of a cnmmal act for
tr ic t~e patient still needs to be punished? Should the NGRI patient be
toeated h~e civil patients or like convicted persons who have been transferred
NGksychia~ric hospitals? These questions and others recur each time an
liti a:· verdict is handed down, and it is only in the most recent years that
prig _ion has begun to sketch in even the vaguest contours of the legal
n~~les ~pplicable to such cases.
.
.
.
"doublus, in at least a partial acknowledgement that the acquitted patient 1s
begu Y cursed ... and doubly neglected," 5 state and federal courts have
guil n to hold - relatively unanimously - that a judicial finding of "not
aut ty by reason of insanity" can no longer be used as a means of
~ally consigning mentally ill criminal defendants to a lifetime in a
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maximum security forensic unit without realistic hope for release. On the
heels of three related United States Supreme Court decisions - Baxstrom v.
Herold, 6 Humphrey v. Cady, 7 and jacks on v. Indiana 8 - which served as a
"first step" 9 towards the establishment of equal treatment for all
hospitalized psychiatric pati en ts, 10 such jurisdictions as the District of
Columbia, 11 New York 12 and others have ruled that NGRl's must be given a
judicial hearing with procedures substantially similar to those afforded civil
patients. 13
This trend 14 reached a high-water mark of sorts with the decision of the
New Jersey Supreme Court in 1975 in State v. Krol. 15 There, the court held
that both due process and equal protection considerations apply to such
matters, that the distinction between the standards for involuntary
commitment for persons acquitted by reason of insanity and other persons
"lacks even a rational basis," 16 that "where personal liberty is involved ...
each individual's fate must be adjudged on the facts of his own case, not on
the general characteristics of a 'class' to which he may be assigned," 17 and
that the same standard for commitment - dangerousness to self or others is applicable to NGRI's as to all other patients.IS In short, the Krol patient
was entitled to virtually the same due process hearing as any other patient
prior to involuntary commitment.
The Krol decision was hailed in the academic literature, 19 for
"inject[ing] coherence into a confused sector of the law," 19A but even as the
praiseworthy analyses filtered in, it was viewed as an example of "how far
courts have come along the road to equalization and how far they still have
to go. " 20 Like any other precedent-shattering decision, Krol raised more
questions than it answered, and served the primary function of peeling
several more layers off the onion of the NGRI proceeding. Soon, attention
would inevitably focus on difficult issues involving treatment and release,
issues merely brushed over in cases such as Krol and earlier similar decisions:
Once committed, what was the extent of the NGRI patient's right to
treatment or right to refuse? By what standards is an NGRI to be released
from a hospital? ls the release hearing to be treated as a civil review
hearing(i.e., with the burden on the prosecuting or committing agency), or is
it to be treated as a habeas corpus hearing (i.e., with the burden on the
defendant-patient)? Does the NGRI finding imply the commission of such a
serious act on the part of the patient as to justify the establishment of an
"exceptional class" which can be held to a stricter release standard than a
"regular" civil patient, or does the acquittal simply mean that the patient is a
civil patient for release purposes because he/she has committed no crime,
and that to suggest otherwise violates constitutional mandates? Finally,
because cases of this sort are often the most sensational, would the publicity
afforded the "Son-of-Sam"-type defendant engender a situation with such a
severe public backlash as to make any sort of NGRI release a virtual political
im possibility?
As might well be expected, the courts have split radically on the
questions involved: state court decisions in Arizona, 21 Michigan,22 and
Indiana, 23 and a federal court in Texas 24 all have held that insanity
acquittees are entitled to the same release procedures applicable to all other
patients; 25 decisions in federal courts in Maryland 2 6 and Washington, D.C. 2 7
30
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have decided that different procedures are permissible.28 Thus, the decision
late in 1977 by the New Jersey Supreme Court - the same court that
d~cided Krol - to certify the case of State v. Hetra Lee Fields for argument
directly from the trial court29 raised the possibility that, perhaps, some sort
of guidelines might be established which could offer aid and guidance to
other courts in other jurisdictions, and which might harmonize some of the
~onflicting prior cases and legal theories. For Fields raised virtually every
issue settled neither by Krol nor by other cases dealing with the procedures
of co~mitment following an NGRI finding.
Fields, the appellant, had been indicted for the stabbing murder of her
boyfriend and was subsequently acquitted by reason of insanity at the time
of the offense. 30 Following Krol procedures, the trial judge ordered her
temporarily confined for observation and evaluation, and subsequent to that
evaluation, the court found Fields mentally ill and a danger to herself and
others and ordered her committed to a civil psychiatric hospital.3 1 Her
~~n:mitment was continued at a review hearing held six months after the
In1t1al hearing, and at a second hearing held six months thereafter, 32 at which
the on(y witness was a hospital physician who testified that the defendant
~as ne1~her mentally ill nor dangerous and that further hospitalization would
f e detrimental to her. 32A At the latter hearing, although the trial judge
dound that the defendant was in a state of remission, he found that "the
efendant's underlying condition of schizophrenia, chronic, undifferentiated
hpe continues and that it is incurable. " 33 He reasoned further that although
t e defendant "may not constitute a present danger ... she constitutes a
P~?bable danger to society because . . . if she becomes exposed to alcohol,
~-is may trigger a psychotic episode," 34 and that her "underlying mental
iseas~ of the mind may erupt. " 3 S He thus continued confinement, subject
to review in one year, and directed the hospital to take steps aimed at her
eventual conditional release.36 The defendant then appealed from this order,
and the Supreme Court certified the case to, in its own words, "resolve
certain important questions not settled by our decision in Krol. " 37
th In her brief to the State Supreme Cour~, ?efendant a~gued that, Just as
e bu~den of proof remains on the comm1ttmg/prosecutmg agency m any
ot~er Involuntary civil commitment proceeding, so it must remain at a
review of an NGRI patient, and that to suggest otherwise would violate due
process and equal protection principles 3B; that the committing/prosecuting
~gency must present affirmative evidence of present mental illness and
hngerousness to justify continued confinement at such a hearing 39; and that
~ e problems raised are especially exacerbated in matters such as these,
~~valving_, as they do, issues of over-prediction of dangerousness,
almcurability" of conditions, and contemporaneity of diagnosis.40 Defendant
~~argued that the verdict below was contrary to the weight of the credible
eyi. ence, and that the court erred in receiving into evidence - and then
giving dispositive weight to - a letter written to the judge some fourteen
months prior to the hearing by a former hospital staff doctor. 41
J On July 3, 1978 - some five months after oral argument - the New
Suprem~ ~ourt decided Fields, and held unequivocally in the course
0~rsey
a 34-page opm1on that:
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NGI committees possess the same right to automatic periodic review of
the justification for their commitment (or lesser restraints, as the case
may be) as that enjoyed by civil committees. We further hold that the
State must bear the ultimate burden of proof in justifying any
continued restrictions upon the liberty of NGI committees at each
periodic review proceeding by establishing, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that such restrictions currently meet the criteria set forth in
Krol for the initial imposition of restraints. 42
The court reiterated its Krol language - premised on Jackson and
Baxstrom - that "the fact that a mentally ill person has committed an act
which would expose a mentally competent person to criminal sanction is a
constitutionally unacceptable justification for granting him less procedural
and substantive protection against involuntary commitment than that
generally afforded all other members of society," 43 and thus concluded that
"due process would seem to require a meaningful periodic review of the
continued legitimacy of restraints on the liberty of all persons whose alleged
dangerousness by reason of mental disability brought about these
restrictions," 44 such hearings to be held at such "reasonable intervals" 45 as
would "guarantee NGI committees equivalent protection [as all other civilly
committed persons] against the unwarranted continuance of state-imposed
restrictions on their liberty. " 46
The court relied on Jackson and O'Connor v. Donaldson 47 to support the
proposition that "the deprivation of [a] person's liberty can constitutionally
continue only so long as the potential for that harm remains sufficiently
great so that his confinement would be warranted were his initial
commitability at issue," 48 noting that this analysis has led the court
originally to promulgate a regular periodic review schedule for all other civil
patients,49 and that, "in light of the constitutional imperative of
substantially equal treatment reflected in Baxstrom and Jackson, we discern
no constitutionally satisfactory justification for denying comparable
protection to NGI committees. " 5 0
It then continued:
A defendant who has successfully avoided criminal sanction by
establishing his insanity at the time he committed the offense for which
he was tried stands on essentially the same legal footing, in terms of his
amenability to involuntary commitment, as any other member of
society. Justification for imposing restraints upon his liberty must be
found under legal criteria which do not "deviate substantially from
those applied to civil commitments generally." State v. Krol, supra, 68
N.]. at 25 l. Prospective NGI committees and prospective civil
committees are constitutionally indistinguishable in terms of their
entitlement to procedural and substantive due process rights. As we
indicated in Krol, the "labels 'criminal commitment' and 'civil
commitment' are of no constitutional significance" in this context. 68
N.]. at 251. Although the particular mechanisms for commitment to
which such persons are subject may differ, the exercise of State power
to deprive them of their liberty must be initially sanctioned and
32
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subsequently reaffirmed under the same substantive test - present
dangerousness by reason of mental illness. To underscore the identity
of these two forms of involuntary imposition of restrictions on an
individual's liberty due to mental disability, we direct that henceforth
commitment proceedings involving prospective NGI committees shall
be captioned as civil actions and entitled "In the Matter of the
Commitment of
"SJ
On the issue of the burden of proof, the court similarly ruled that, as the
State bears the burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence on
the necessity for the initial imposition of restraints, "it must similarly
reestablish its authority to restrict the liberty of the committee by showing
that his present condition warrants their continuance. " 52 It quoted what it
characterized as an "eloquent" statement by the Connecticut Supreme Court
of "compelling reasons" for allocating the burden of proof to the state at
such hearing: s3
The burden should not be placed on the civilly committed patient to
justify his right to liberty. Freedom from involuntary confinement for
those who have committed no crime is the natural state of individuals
in this country. The burden must be placed on the state to prove the
necessity of stripping the citizen of one of his most fundamental rights,
and the risk of error must rest on the state. Since the state has no
greater right to confine a patient after the validity of the original
commitment has expired than it does to commit him in the first place,
the state must bear the burden of proving the necessity of
recommitment, just as it bears the burden of proving the necessity for
commitment. s4

r

The court thus reasoned that "the State must renew its authority to subject
a committee to a partial or total deprivation of his liberty at each periodic
review hearing by demonstrating that such a deprivation is warranted by the
committee's current condition."ss
Following this clear and straightforward treatment of the relevant
principles of constitutional law, the Court then shifted into a lengthy
philosophical discourse on the gestalt of the review hearing. If the State fails
to meet its burden of justifying continuance of restraints, it is the task of the
reviewing judge to "mold" an appropriate order based upon his evaluation of
the "level of restraints dictated by the committee's present condition. "S6
However, "the mere failure of the State to prove the necessity of continuing
the prevailing restraints does not entitle the committee to relaxation of those
restraints to any extent he might desire;" 57 in all cases the "determination of
the suitable level of restraint is a matter entrusted to the sound discretion of
the reviewing judge ... who must be accorded a wide range of flexibility. " 58
And, "even where the committee's condition shows marked improvement,
only the most extraordinary case would justify modification in any manner
~ther than by a gradual deescalation of the restraints upon the committee's
h~e~ty." 59 Such a process of gradual deescalation will "substantially
mm1mize the risk of erroneous determinations of non-dangerousness and will
Release Procedures and Allocation of the Burden of Proof

33

thus protect the State's compelling interest in maintaining the safety and
security of its citizens."60
The court further ruled that, for the first two years of review hearings,
"live" psychiatric testimony as to present mental condition and
dangerousness must be presented 61 ; after that point, that requirement may
be relaxed and written reports of a psychiatrist who testified in an earlier
proceeding may be submitted as long as they are based on current
reevaluations. 62 However, if the patient chooses to present his own
psychiatric testimony at such a hearing in support of a request for lessening
of restraints, and the State chooses to challenge that request, the State
"should ordinarily support its position with psychiatric testimony." 63 A
similar rule applies if the State seeks to tighten restraints. 64
This rule relaxation "is not intended to sanction any deprivation of the
committee's right to meaningful confrontation," 65 the court warned, noting
that any factual evidence of the patient's behavior "bearing upon present
dangerousness and contravened should be presented through competent
evidence,"66 and underscoring - once again - that "the committee in these
proceedings enjoys rights of procedural and substantive due process
comparable to those available in any judicial proceeding where liberty is at
stake." 67
The court again repeated language from Krol that "the decision is not one
that can be left wholly to the technical expertise of the psychiatrists and
psychologists . . . [and] is ultimately a legal one, not a medical one, "68
warning that judges "often accord undue deference to the presumed
expertise underlying psychiatric opinions on [the]
issue [of
dangerousness] ;"69 that psychiatric opinion "is no more conclusive on the
dangerousness issue than is evidence from lay sources concerning particular
instances where the committee has manifested actual or potential harmful
behavior, " 70 and that "the final decision on the need for and appropriate
extent of restrictions on the committee's liberty is for the court, not the
psychiatrists. " 7 1
"The focus ... must always be upon the actual conduct of the committee,
not merely upon its characterization as 'criminal' or anti-social conduct, " 72
the court continued, but added that the patient's "prior commission of an
act for which he has been relieved of criminal responsibility is powerful
evidence of his potential dangerousness. "7 3
At a review hearing, "all prior evidence, both factual and expert,
pertaining to [the] issues of [current condition and need for restrictions on
liberty] remains relevant;" 74 the new review hearing is not a "clean slate,"
although "the passage of time might diminish the relevancy of certain expert
diagnostic evidence to the point where it may be insignificant. " 75
The court finally ruled that its decision would have retrospective
application to all NGRI patients "who are presently subject to any restraints
upon their liberty,"76 and thus ruled that all such persons 77 were entitled to
a review hearing under the guidelines announced in Fields within 60 days of
the entry of the opinion. 78
One judge concurred, objecting only to the two-year line of demarcation
as to the type of psychiatric testimony required, seeing "no justification "79
for such a distinction, while one justice dissented in part on the issue of the
34
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quantum of burden of proof, arguing that the State should be required to
prove "beyond any reasonable doubt" SO the need to restrict one's liberty on
account of mental illness.8 1 In no instance, however, did any member of the
court dissent from the opinion's basic premises: that the NGRI patient is
entitled to periodic review in the same way as any other patient, and that the
burden of proof remains on the state at all such subsequent review hearings.
Has Fields, then, definitively clarified the issues in question? As is usually
the case with opinions of a court of last resort, 82 the answer can be only
"Yes and no." It is likely that the opinion will be afforded heavy precential
value in other states on both of its major holdings; on the other hand, the
court did not clearly come to grips with the specific sub-issues of
overpredictivity of dangerousness, "incurability" of psychiatric conditions,
and significance of contemporaneity of diagnoses. Under Krol and State v.
Carter, 83 an earlier New Jersey case, NGRI patients were guaranteed the
"right to treatment. "84 This was not elaborated upon in Fields - most likely
b~cause there was no current evidence of her mental illness - so questions
still remain in this regard. The opinion chose to couch ancillary issues in
language involving the appropriate "suitable" level of restraints," 85
phraseology much more reminiscent of cases involving the "least restrictive
alternative,"86 a right made elsewhere applicable to all New Jersey patients
by statute 87 and case law, 88 but not mentioned in Fields. Further, the
troublesome issues of the scope of civil rights extended to NGRI patients is
not dealt with squarely. Although virtually all such civil rights (save such
specific areas as expungement 89 and interstate transferrability 9 0) generally
~re ~ade applicable to all patients (including NGRI's) in states with
Patients' bills of rights,"9 1 it still is likely that the precise scope of the
extent of such rights will be dealt with by other courts on a strict
case-by-case basis. ·
~inally, although Fields gives the law, so to speak, to the lawyers for the
Patients, it - to some extent - gives the facts to the lawyers for the state. Its
emphasis on the NGRI's "propensity ... to engage in serious antisocial
conduct ... on at least one occasion" 92 and on the fact that the prior
commission of such an act is "powerful evidence of his potential
dangerousness" 93 underlines the court's concern that truly dangerous
persons - the paradigmatic "Son-of-Sam"-type patient - not be prematurely
released. Indeed, in a footnote buried in the middle of the opinion, the court
~akes note of the "conceptual anomaly of the law, so often
inc?mprehensible to lay persons and provocative of community outrage," 94
Whi.ch holds that an NGRI committee "may not accurately be considered as
~aving engaged in criminal acts, " 95 virtually suggesting legislative action to
correct" 96 the anomaly.
~anguage such as this will most likely insure that, while NGRI patients are
entitled to virtually full procedural due process protections under Fields, the
~ases of such patients will still be investigated minutely to insure that the
. GRI patient is not, in the words of the title of a recent provocative article
in .the public press, "getting away with murder. "9 7 It is hoped, however, that
this. caution does not allow for the perpetuation of the situation referred to
earlier, in which the acquitted patient is "doubly cursed ... and doubly
neglected. " 98 Hopefully, it will mean that each case will be individually
Release Procedures and Allocation of the Burden of Proof
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assessed on a fact-by-fact, case-by-case basis in a procedurally fair context.
Such an outcome truly would be a most needed reform welcomed by all
parties to such proceedings.
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